State-owned enterprises
Fixing China Inc
Reform of state companies is back on the agenda
JIN JIANG is one of the world’s biggest hotel groups, managing five-star properties across China, a budget motel chain and a travel agency. It is also a state-owned enterprise (SOE), controlled by the Shanghai government. It has seen better days. The company’s best hotels played host to hundreds of foreign leaders in the past century, including Richard Nixon in 1972, when America and China began their historic rapprochement. But in recent years visiting dignitaries have opted for newer hotels over Jin Jiang’s musty rooms and tired furnishings.
When people think of Chinese state companies, they often have its giant banks or oil companies in mind. But most of the 155,000 enterprises still owned by the central and local governments are more akin to Jin Jiang: they are businesses that have little to do with the country’s economic or political priorities, and they have had a run of bad years, losing ground to private-sector rivals. That may be about to change. China is in the midst of the biggest attempt in more than a decade to fix the country’s brand of state capitalism, attempting to breathe new life into Jin Jiang and dozens, if not hundreds or even thousands, more like it.
There are two main problems with China’s SOEs today. First, they have failed to comply with the government’s order to focus on what are deemed to be “strategic sectors” such as aviation, power and telecommunications. These are industries that the Communist Party believes it must dominate in order to maintain control of an increasingly complex economy. But fewer than half of state companies occupy these commanding heights. Some 80,000 are instead in the economic lowlands: they run hotels, build property developments, manage restaurants and operate shopping malls. The temptations to branch out have been too great: relative to their private-sector peers, they have benefited from cheaper financing from state-owned banks, favouritism from local governments in land sales and a lighter touch from regulators.
Second, despite these advantages, SOEs have given progressively less bang for their buck. Faced with mounting losses in the 1990s, China undertook a first round of drastic reforms of its state-owned companies. There were mass closures of the weakest firms, tens of millions of lay-offs and stockmarket listings for many of the biggest which made them run a little more like private companies. That initially paid dividends. SOEs’ return on assets, a gauge of their productivity, rose from barely higher than zero in 1998 to nearly 7% a decade later, just shy of the private-sector average. But over the past five years, their fortunes have ebbed. Profitability of state companies has fallen, even as private firms have grown in strength. SOE returns are now about half those of their non-state peers. For an economy that, inevitably, is slowing as it matures, inefficient state companies are a dangerous extra drag. Jian Chang of Barclays says that putting SOEs right is “the most critical reform area for China in the coming decade”.
Until recently, however, few analysts thought that China had the desire or the ability to get back into the muck of SOE reform. Companies under the central government, such as PetroChina, the country’s biggest oil producer, were believed to be strong enough to resist the changes that would erode their privileges. At the provincial and municipal levels, local officials were thought bound to government-owned companies by ties of power, patronage and money. China was not expected to sit entirely still: gradual deregulation of interest rates and energy pricing was placing indirect pressure on state companies to operate more efficiently. But a direct, frontal assault on them of the kind waged by Zhu Rongji, then prime minister, in the 1990s seemed out of the question. Even when the party unveiled a much-ballyhooed reform plan last November and vowed to target SOEs, there were doubts about how far Xi Jinping, China’s president, could go. People close to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the agency that oversees China’s biggest SOEs, say that it was still dragging its feet at the start of this year.
But a flurry of announcements in the past few months shows that reforms are getting on track. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. Sinopec, Asia’s biggest refiner, is close to selling a $16 billion stake in its retail unit, a potentially lucrative opening for private investors. CITIC Group, China’s biggest conglomerate, is poised to become a publicly traded company by injecting its assets into a subsidiary on the Hong Kong stock exchange, for $37 billion. After its initial reluctance, SASAC announced reforms at six companies. They are to experiment with larger private stakes and greater independence for directors.
Although generating fewer headlines, moves by local governments to sell their companies could be even more significant for the Chinese economy. Local SOEs have performed worse than their central counterparts, meaning there is plenty of scope for improvement. They are more accessible to private investors since they are concentrated in non-strategic sectors. “It’s opening wide up. There is a ridiculous amount of deal flow coming our way,” says a manager with an international private-equity firm. The southern province of Guangdong recently held a meeting at which it offered stakes in 50 different SOEs, according to people present. Shanghai has also been at the forefront. In June it sold a 12% stake in a subsidiary of the Jin Jiang hotel group to Hony Capital, a local private-equity firm. Analysts say that this will encourage better management practices at Jin Jiang, including stock-option incentives for executives, and that it could serve as a template for future such deals.
The received wisdom in China used to be that “vested interests”, namely SOEs themselves, would thwart reform. Few believe that any more. With more than 100 officials from PetroChina, the biggest SOE of all, now under investigation for corruption, Mr Xi has flexed his muscles. His call this month for strict pay caps on the bosses of big SOEs should be read as a warning to them to fall in line.
Bolder experiments with privatisation would be far preferable but the political reality is that the state wants to retain control of banks, trains and more. These constraints, though, are not suffocating. “There is a lot of room for reform before touching political red lines,” says Andrew Batson of Gavekal Dragonomics. Selling stakes in companies that the government itself says it has no business owning, from petrol stations to hotels, is a good start.
國有企業
修復中國公司
國有企業改革是重新提上日程
錦江是世界上最大的酒店集團之一,管理五星級物業在中國,廉價汽車旅館連鎖和一家旅行社。這也是一個國有企業(國有企業),由上海政府控制。它已經看到更好的日子。該公司的最好的酒店在過去的一個世紀,1972年,當美國和中國開始了歷史性的和解接待了數百名外國領導人,其中包括理查德·尼克松。但近年來來訪的貴賓都選擇了錦江的霉味房間,累了的家具較新的酒店。
當人們認為中國國有企業,它們往往擁有巨大的銀行或石油企業的初衷。但大部分由中央和地方政府仍擁有155,000企業更類似於錦江:他們是企業,有什麼與該國的經濟或政治優先事項,而且他們有過不好年的運行,節節敗退私營部門的對手。這可能會發生變化。中國是在十幾年的最大努力來解決該國的國家資本主義的品牌之中,試圖注入新的活力錦江和幾十個,甚至幾百個甚至上千個,更喜歡它。
還有中國的國有企業現在存在兩個主要問題。首先,他們沒有遵守政府的命令把重點放在被認為是“戰略性行業”,如航空,電力和電信。這些行業共產黨認為它必須佔據主導地位,以維持一個日益複雜的經濟控制。不過,只有不到一半的國有企業佔據這些制高點。有些80000頃,而不是在經濟低地:他們經營酒店,建物業發展,管理餐廳和經營購物中心。誘惑分支出來已經過大:相對於私人部門的同事,他們都受益於國有銀行的廉價資金,徇私舞弊地方政府在賣地和監管較輕的觸感。
其次,儘管有這些優勢,國有企業已經給了他們的降壓逐步減少爆炸。面對巨額虧損,在20世紀90年代,中國進行了第一輪的國有企業大刀闊斧的改革。有最弱的企業大規模倒閉,數以千萬計的裁員和股市的房源很多這使他們多了幾分運行像民營企業最大的。最初支付的股息。國有企業的資產收益率,生產力的計,上升至勉強高於零,1998年達到近7%十年過去了,略低於私營部門的平均水平。但在過去五年中,他們的命運也隨之消退。國有企業的盈利能力下降,甚至私營公司已經發展壯大。國有企業的回報,現在大約一半的非國家的同齡人。為此,不可避免地放緩,因為它的成熟的經濟體系,效率低下的國有企業是一個危險的額外的阻力。巴克萊的常健表示,把國有企業的權利是“未來十年最重要的改革領域,中國”。
直到最近,然而,很少有分析師認為,中國有願望或重新進入國有企業改革的淤泥的能力。中央政府下的公司,如中石油,該國最大的石油生產國,據信是強大到足以抵擋這將削弱其特權的變化。在省,市兩級地方官員通過權力,贊助和金錢的關係想結合,以政府擁有的公司。中國預計不會坐完全靜止:利率和能源價格逐步放鬆管制是把對國有企業的間接壓力,以更有效地運作。但對他們的直接,正面進攻朱鎔基,當時的首相發動,在上世紀90年代的那種似乎出了問題。即使當一方公佈了大肆宣傳的改革計劃去年十一月,並誓言要針對國有企業,大約有多遠習近平,中國國家主席,可以去懷疑。知情人士向國務院國有資產監督管理委員會(國資委),負責監督中國最大的國有企業的機構說,它仍然一拖再拖,在今年開始。
但在過去幾個月公佈亂舞表明,改革步入正軌。有沒有一個放之四海而皆準的所有方法。中石化是亞洲最大的煉油,接近賣16美元十億的股份,其零售單位,一個潛在的有利可圖的開放私人投資者。中信集團,中國最大的企業集團,即將成為一家上市公司注入其資產注入在香港聯合交易所的子公司,37美元十億。其最初的不情願後,國資委宣布的改革,在六家公司。他們嘗試規模較大的民營股份及董事的獨立性。
雖然產生較少的頭條新聞,移動地方政府賣他們的公司可能更顯著中國經濟。地方國有企業比他們的同行中央執行更糟,這意味著有大量的改進餘地。他們更容易向私人投資者,因為他們都集中在非戰略性領域。“它敞開了。有交易流量來我們的方式荒謬的量,說:“與國際私募股權投資公司的經理。廣東省南部近日召開的一次會議上,它提供了50個不同的國有企業的股份,按照目前的人。上海也已經走在了前列。在6月,出售12%股權的錦江酒店集團的子公司弘毅投資,當地的私募股權投資公司。分析人士認為,這將鼓勵更好的管理辦法,在錦江,包括股票期權激勵高管,而且它可以作為未來類似交易的模板。
在中國接受的智慧曾經是“既得利益者”,即國有企業本身,會阻撓改革。很少有人相信了。與中石油,其中最大的國有企業,目前正在調查貪污100多官員,習先生健碩的肌肉。他呼籲在本月對大國企的老闆們嚴格的薪酬上限應被解讀為警告,他們加入行列。
私有化更大膽的實驗將是更可取的,但政治現實是,國家要保留銀行,火車和更多的控制權。這些約束,但是,都沒有令人窒息。“有很多感人的政治紅線前室改革”Gavekal龍洲經訊的安德魯·巴特森說。出售股份的公司,政府本身說,它沒有任何業務擁有,從加油站到旅館,是一個良好的開端。
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