泰国
The exile and the kingdom
流亡者与国王
Fixing Thailand's broken politics requires the government, the opposition and the monarchy all to change
修复泰国破碎的政治需要政府、反对派和王室都作出变革
Nov 30th 2013 | From the print edition
YET again, anarchy threatens Thailand. Rival crowds of pro- and anti-government protesters have gathered in Bangkok. The (far more numerous) antis have occupied government ministries, prompting the government to extend special security laws across the capital. The government has seen off a no-confidence motion in parliament but its future remains in doubt, in the face of challenges not just on the streets but also in the courts. Violence may return. Blame for the resurgence of the chaos that plagued Thailand in 2006-10 lies with the government, the opposition and the institution to which they both look for their legitimacy—the monarchy.
泰国又一次陷入无政府状态。曼谷街头已经聚集了大批的示威者，他们之中既有反对政府的，也有支持政府的。多个政府部门已经被人数上占绝对优势的反对派占领。为此，政府已将特别安全法律的适用范围扩展到了整个首都地区。对于本届政府来说，虽然他们已经赢得了一次议会的不信任案表决，但是其前景依然不明。他们不仅要面对来自街头的挑战，还要等待法庭的判决。暴力可能卷土重来。2006年-2010年的那场混乱曾让这个国家深受其害，而如今这一幕再度重演，其责任在于政府、反对派以及上述双方都向其寻求合法性的机构——泰国王室。
The government is led formally by Yingluck Shinawatra, the prime minister, but informally by her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, a wealthy tycoon. Deposed in a coup in 2006 and later convicted of abusing his power, Mr Thaksin runs the government by remote control from self-imposed exile in Dubai. Thailand's social and business elites regard him as corrupt and high-handed, and are appalled by his populist economic policies. But, thanks in large measure to his popularity in the rural north and north-east, Mr Thaksin's party (its latest incarnation is called Pheu Thai) keeps winning elections—in 2001 and 2005, and (through proxies) in 2007 and 2011.
从表面上，政府是由总理英拉·西那瓦领导，但实际上却是由她的兄长商业大亨他信·西那瓦遥控指挥。他信在2006年的一次军事政变中被推翻，随后又被判滥用职权，目前正在迪拜过着自我流放的生活。在泰国的社会和商业精英眼中，他信是一个腐败而且专权的人。他的民粹式经济政策令他们感到了震惊。但是，他信在泰国北部以及东北部的农村地区享有很大威望，从而使得他的政党（最新代言人被称为为泰党）在2001年-2005年间一直是选举的赢家，并且还在2007年和2011年两次通过代理人赢得选举。
Until recently Ms Yingluck's government seemed to have reached an accommodation with the establishment. Then it pushed through the lower house of parliament a sweeping amnesty bill which would have let Mr Thaksin return home, while expunging thousands of other court cases. There was huge opposition to the bill, even among some of Mr Thaksin's former fans, who thought it went too far. It was thrown out in the Senate. Retreating, Ms Yingluck promised not to revive it.
英拉政府似乎在前不久已经同当权派达成了和解。于是，他们在议会下院强行通过了一份赦免法案。该法案涉及面极大，在数千个法律案件的同时，还允许他信返回国内。但是，也有许多人对这个持反对的态度，其人有些人甚至是他信的前支持者，他们认为这个法案走得太远了。在该法案被参议院驳回后，英拉做出了让步，并承诺说今后不会再提出这个法案。
Encouraged, the opposition pushed its advantage. The partially appointed Senate tends to side with the opposition, so the government has been trying to change the constitution to make it fully elected. On November 20th the constitutional court backed the opposition's view that the amendment was unconstitutional; it has yet to rule on whether those who voted for it broke Thailand's strict lèse-majesté law.
受此鼓舞，反对派继续扩大战果。此前，由于部分被任命的参议员往往站在反对派一边，因此现任政府一直在试图修改宪法，目的是为了让参议员全部由选举产生。但是，反对派认为这是一种违宪的做法，其行为违反了该国严格的冒犯君主法。于是，他们上述到泰国宪法法院。11月20日，泰国宪法法院对他们的前一个观点表示了认可，但是并未对第二关观点作出裁决。
Like some of its predecessors, the government may thus be finished off by the judiciary. But even after the amnesty fiasco, Ms Yingluck may well win a fresh election. And in the meantime, the two sides' supporters slug it out on the streets, and Thailand totters.
如果按照之前曾经有过的例子，本届政府有可能会在赦免案惨败后被勒令解散。但是，即便如此，英拉仍有可能在下次大选中获胜。在这种背景下，双方支持者走上街头，一决高下，国家随之动荡起来。
Prince charmless
毫无魅力的王储
For this stalemate to end, three changes are needed. First, the opposition—led by the members of the main establishment political party, the Democrats—must abandon its undemocratic tactics. Its leaders want it both ways. They support parliamentary democracy when it produces the “right” result; when it does not, they resort to the streets, the courts or a phone call to army headquarters. That must stop.
因此，为了结束当前的政治僵局，需要反对派、现任政府和泰国王室三方都作出改变。对于以民主党为首的反对派来说，他们必须放弃不民主的策略。作为泰国政坛的一只主要政党，民主党领导人必须停止“黑白通吃”的做法。不能再在结果“正确”时，就对议会民主制表示支持，在“不正确”时就转向街头，诉诸法庭，甚或是给军方大本营打一个电话。
Second, Thaksinite governments have to learn that they must use their electoral mandates not just to win the renewed votes of their supporters next time—still less to run government for Mr Thaksin's ends—but for the good of the country. That includes confronting corruption, ditching crazy policies, such as a price-support scheme for rice, and promoting a better business climate.
对于以他信为幕后的本届政府来说，他们必须吸取教训，必须把通过选举而获得的权力用来为国家谋利，而不是仅仅用它们来换取新的选票。他们必须打击腐败，叫停为大米设定最低收购价等疯狂的政策，营造一个更好的商业氛围。
Third, the monarchy must stop playing politics and accept the symbolic role the constitution accords it. Two looming events have helped make Thai politics so frenzied. One is the 86th birthday on December 5th of Thailand's revered king for 67 years, Bhumibol Adulyadej. By tradition, harmony is supposed to prevail on that day. The king will probably be too frail to make his customary birthday speech. His unpopular son, the crown prince, is likely to succeed him. None of this is discussed in Thailand, for it would contravene the lèse-majesté (as this leader now does too).
对于泰国王室来说，他们必须停止干政，接受宪法赋予他们的象征性角色。泰国政坛最近之所以如此疯狂，是因为有两件事正在日益迫近。一是，已经在位67年并且深受民众爱戴的泰国国王普密蓬·阿杜德将在12月5日迎来86岁生日。按照传统，在这一天，和谐是压倒一切的主题。但是，由于国王身体太虚弱，他有可能取消当天的例行讲话。其二，可能在他之后继承王位的王储，并不是一个受欢迎之人。这两件事可以说是迫在眉睫的大事，但奇怪的的是，竟然没有一件事被提到议事日程上来。因为，这是一种大不敬的行为，可能会触犯《冒犯君主法》。
This pernicious law blocks rational discourse about urgently needed reforms. Thailand's constitution not only has undemocratic elements, but also gives the central government too much power. That has helped fuel a long-running bloody conflict in the Muslim south. It may yet help spark another, in the Thaksin-supporting north-east. The royal family should give its explicit support to constitutional reform—and first call for an end to lèse-majesté.
《冒犯君主法案》是一项有害的法律，它妨碍了人们对于改革的正常交流，而这种改革又是当前的泰国所急需的。除此之外，泰国宪法中也有许多不民主的成分在内，而中央政府则借此掌握了太多的权力。这种情况助长了该国南部的穆斯林同政府进行长期的流血冲突，并且还有可能在支持他信的东北部地区引发另一场冲突。因此，泰国王室应该对修宪给与明确的支持，而其中第一步就是叫停《冒犯君主法》。
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